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A Comparative Analysis
of the Evolution of the
Three Major U.S. Meat Industries
With Implications for the Future Direction
of the U.S. Beef Industry
Jeffrey Gillespie, Christopher Davis, Aydin Basarir,
and Alvin Schupp**

1. Introduction
The structures of the U.S. livestock and poultry industries
have undergone dramatic change in recent years. While the
physical dimensions of structural change are observed in the
reduced number and increased size of today’s firms, equally
interesting are changes in the business arrangements used in
these industries. Formal means of vertical coordination have
significantly changed the way many producers conduct business
with up- and downstream firms.
Major forces influencing structural change in the agricultural
sector include shifting consumer demands; new technologies that
lead to larger, more specialized production operations; and more
environmentally oriented public policy. We examine the evolution
of the U.S. hog, broiler, and beef industries, focusing on factors
that have influenced structural changes in each industry. While
we do not present definitive explanations for all of the forces that
have influenced the evolution of these industries, we attempt to

*The authors are, respectively, Associate Professor, Graduate Students, and Martin E.Woodin
Professor, Department of Agricultural Economics and Agribusiness, Louisiana Agricultural Experiment
Station, LSU Agricultural Center.
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provide a better understanding of the forces and to compare and
contrast the unique evolutionary paths taken by each industry.
The questions “Why have the three industries evolved differently?” and “Do significant incentives exist for the beef industry
to vertically coordinate in a manner similar to the broiler and hog
industries?” are addressed.
The objectives of this study are to: (1) use an appropriate
model of structural change in agricultural industries to critically
examine the evolutionary paths of the three major U.S. meat
industries to date, and to (2) provide insight as to the future
challenges faced by the beef industry in progressing toward a
more efficient consumer-oriented industry.
The organization of this paper is reminiscent of Reimund et al.
We first examine selected broad industry trends, proceed by
examining the existing theory of industry evolution, then provide
case studies of the broiler, hog, and beef cattle industries and
compare and contrast the evolution to date of the three industries.
Finally, we provide our observations on the path the beef industry
is likely to take in its future development.

1.1

Trends in the Livestock and Poultry Industries

At least three major trends in the livestock and poultry industries have either influenced or been influenced by the evolution of
the industries. These include (1) increased farm sizes, technology,
and overall production; (2) changes in consumption patterns of
meat; and (3) increased vertical coordination in the livestock and
poultry industries. Discussion of each of these trends follows.

1.1.1

Livestock and Poultry Production

A significant trend in each of the major meat industries has
been a dramatic increase in firm size over the past 50 years,
especially in the hog and broiler industries. Table 1 presents
measures of physical structural change in each of the three examined industries (U.S. Agricultural Census). Broiler growers producing 1 to 59,999 broilers accounted for 97 percent of all broiler
growers in 1954. By 1997, the percentage had declined to 25
percent. Few growers produced 100,000 or more broilers in 1954;
by 1997, 68 percent of growers were in this category. Changes
5

Table 1. Farms by number of units sold per farm, 1954 to 1997
Year

1954

1959

1964

1969

48407
1687a
N/A

36083
3848
2254

24838
5890
4400

1 to 49
50 to 99
100 to 199
200 to 499
500 or More

3816850
79168
47059b
N/A
N/A

3055291
102638
45653
23823c
N/A

1 to 99
100 to 199
200 to 499
500 to 999
1000 or More

1755245
111922
42768c
N/A
N/A

101867
161611
81572
9983
1542

1 to 59,999
60,000 to 99,999
100,000 or more

1974

6

1978

1982

1987

1992

1997

17519
7195
7634

Broilers
15532
14436
6561
5284
9314
12023

13209
3677
13214

10236
2936
14473

6640
1801
15508

6089
1536
16312

1947044
122580
54222
25334
7999

923043
149058
68896
35140
12392

Beef Cattle
1207107
1157577
127533
139273
58105
64120
31979
35887
12377
29972

837738
150170
58253
23781
6205

930326
119309
54843
31485
14560

829962
108376
51227
30061
14563

808801
107245
51676
29612
14475

575124
105458
54317
6433
1136

287162
113197
102999
25904
7089

Hogs
259831
237402
59244
67558
47790
73100
11908
29766
4058
15752

163063
44400
55954
30030
21648

109811
32667
44901
27515
23925

76771
23182
35426
25038
27750

43745
9597
15037
11967
21760

This figure includes 60,000 or more, since the category 100,000 or more was not collected in 1954.
This figure includes 100 or more, since the categories 200 to 499 and 500 or more were not collected in 1954.
C
This figure includes 200 or more, since the category 500 or more was not collected in 1959.
a

b

have also occurred in beef cattle production: in 1954, farmers
having 1 to 49 head accounted for 97 percent of all beef cattle
operations, while farmers having 100 or more head of beef cattle
accounted for 1 percent. By 1997, 80 percent were in the 1- to 49head category, and 9 percent were in the 100-or-more-head category. While this shows significant structural change, it is not as
dramatic as in the broiler industry. Hog producers producing 1 to
99 hogs in 1954 accounted for 92 percent of all producers. Few
producers produced over 500 hogs. By 1997, only 42 percent
produced fewer than 100 hogs, while 21 percent produced more
than 1,000 hogs.
Along with increased farm size and decreased farm numbers,
the U.S. commercial slaughter of broilers, hogs, and cattle also
changed over the period 1950 to 1997 (Figure 1). In 1950, 1,945
million pounds of broiler meat were processed in the United
States. By 1997, 37,523 million pounds were processed, a 2,107
percent increase. Hog slaughter increased from 16,690 million
pounds in 1950 to 25,863 million pounds in 1998, a 55 percent
increase. Cattle slaughter increased from 17,704 million pounds in
1950 to 42,806 million in 1996, a 142 percent increase. However,
most of the increase in beef slaughter occurred prior to 1976, and
it leveled off afterward. Sharp increases in broiler slaughter
occurred in the late 1970s, during the late 1980s, and throughout
the 1990s. Trends in per capita consumption (Figure 2) are, not
surprisingly, similar to commercial slaughter.
Continued technological development in the agricultural
sector has been a primary force for change in the structure of
agricultural industries. Examples of technological developments
in livestock production include genetically improved breeding
stock, automated feeders, video marketing, improved disease
control, controlled environments, computerized information
systems for monitoring herd performance and health, medicated
feed, and others. Changing technology has made possible larger
production units that benefit from increased economies of size.
The use of such technologies has been affordable to only a subset
of producers, thereby forcing the exit of those who could not or
would not adopt them. Adoption of the newer technology has led
to increased herd or flock sizes, and the accompanying increased
size economies have led to larger, more specialized operations.
7
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Larger, specialized operations have led producers and processors
to search for business arrangements through which risks and/or
transaction costs could be reduced.

1.1.2 U.S. Consumption of Beef, Pork, and Chicken
A second trend that has influenced the three industry structures has been changing meat consumption patterns. At least
three factors have encouraged the significant increase in U.S. per
capita broiler consumption relative to other meats. First, health
concerns associated with eating red meats have decreased their
relative attractiveness to consumers. Second, during the past 50
years, the broiler and, later, the hog industries have become more
cost efficient relative to the beef industry in animal production. As
a result, hog and broiler prices increased less than beef prices
during the mid-1960s and afterward (Figure 3). The consumer
price has been highest for beef, thus reducing the quantity of beef
consumed. And third, the increase in broiler consumption relative
to beef has been partially due to the increase in value-added
convenience items for chicken relative to beef. New value-added
beef products have been developed very slowly relative to competing meats. Ritchie et al. report that, at the 1996 Meat Marketing Conference in Phoenix, Arizona, a major supermarket chain
listed only five pre-packaged, consumer-ready beef products,
while more than 70 poultry, 58 pork, 7 veal, and 6 lamb items
were listed. Today’s consumers increasingly demand tasty, easyto-prepare, value-added products (Senauer et al.). The uniformity
and consistency in the quality of poultry and pork products
compared with beef have also increased the demand for poultry
and pork relative to beef.

1.1.3 Vertical Coordination in the Livestock and
Poultry Industries
Increased vertical coordination has been a major trend in the
U.S. meat industries. Vertical coordination, however, has evolved
differently in the three sub-sectors. More than 99 percent of U.S.
broilers are produced by vertically coordinated firms, while it is
reasonable to expect that 20 percent to 30 percent of hogs are
produced by vertically coordinated firms. The prevalent form of
vertical coordination in the broiler industry evolved during the
10
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1950s, resulting in the current supply chain structure, in which
growers typically contract with a firm integrated from feed mill to
processor. This type of structure is frequently referred to as
vertical integration, though it may be more appropriate to term it
as quasi-vertical integration – while the integrator maintains
ownership of birds and feed throughout the production process,
growout of these birds is contracted with a separate firm, which
prevents the term “vertical integration” from being used in its
purest sense. Vertical integration in the strictest sense occurs
when one firm owns and operates all segments involved in the
coordination effort.
The hog industry continues to vertically coordinate, moving
toward a structure similar to the broiler industry. Major moves
toward vertical coordination began in the 1970s and 1980s. The
beef industry has become more coordinated, though its structure
has evolved differently and more slowly than the other two
industries. While 17 percent to 23 percent of steer and heifer
slaughter consisted of captive supplies during 1988-1994 (Ward et
al.), little formal coordination links breeders or cow-calf operations to packers. Retained ownership is among the vertical coordination linkages between cow-calf producers and packers that will
be discussed in more detail later in this bulletin.

2. The Theory of Industry Evolution
What factors are responsible for the nature of evolution in an
industry? Economists have developed dynamic models to explain the evolution of industries toward formal vertical coordination. Stigler argues that firms tend to conduct all phases of production when an industry is relatively new, or in the first stage of
evolution, since the extent of the market does not support specialized firms. Hence, an industry is vertically integrated early in its
development. In the second stage, as the market grows, the extent
of the market becomes large enough to support specialized firms.
In the third stage, as the market shrinks, firms tend to reintegrate
and undertake more joint processes.
The structure-conduct-performance paradigm models the
laws of motion of an industry (Caves). Structure, including
elements such as seller concentration, product differentiation,
12

barriers to entry of new firms, buyer concentration, height of
fixed costs and the resulting barriers to exit, and market demand,
affects market conduct. Market conduct refers to how a firm sets
policies and reacts to market rivals. Conduct includes three major
elements: setting prices, product quality and non-price policies,
seeking strategic advantage, and deterring entry. Caves defines
market performance as “the appraisal of how far the economic
results of an industry’s behavior fall short of the best possible
contribution it could make to achieve (the industry’s) goals.” The
structure-conduct-performance paradigm models the dynamics of
an industry.
Reimund et al. discuss structural change in four stages: (1)
change in technology, (2) shift in location of production, (3)
industry growth and development, and (4) adjustment to risk.
They argue that initial changes are driven by forces external to the
industry, such as consumer demand or new technology. These
forces lead to the adoption of new production technology. Regions that have comparative advantages in the new technology
adopt it. As the new technology is adopted, industry growth and
development evolve as firms become more specialized and
concentrated, thus increasing risk. Adjustments to risk generally
encourage formal vertical coordination.
Gillespie et al. modified the Reimund et al. model to explain
structural change in the Quebec hog industry. Transaction costs
are included, the role of the structure-conduct-performance
paradigm is made explicit, and endogenous and exogenous
factors affecting industry structure are formally discussed.
Boehlje summarizes five models of structural change in
agriculture: the technology, human capital, financial, institutional,
and sociological models. He discusses how each influences firm
size, property rights, and coordination in agriculture. He argues
that (1) technology gives rise to economies of scale and size in
agriculture; (2) human capital enhances managerial skills and
increases management’s ability to process information and implement new technology; (3) finance allows producers to combine
durable and non-durable goods to increase farm size and leverage; (4) the institutional model examines the structure, conduct,
and performance of an industry; and (5) the sociological model
describes individual and family roles in the firm.
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Boehlje and Schrader use a life-cycle theory to analyze structural change in the U.S. hog industry. They argue that rapid
industry structural change occurs at the convergence of four
cycles: (1) the product life cycle, (2) the investment / replacement
life cycle, (3) the manager / producer life cycle, and (4) the technological life cycle. They argue that the transformation of pork
products, upgraded facilities, plans for managerial succession,
and innovative technology provided windows of opportunity for
growth when they occurred simultaneously.
Barkema argues that structural change in the U.S. food system
has occurred because of changes in food consumption, food
production, and the retail food market. He pinpoints consumers
as a driving force for structural change through changing demographics, lifestyles, diets, and emergence of new market niches,
placing more emphasis on the importance of consumer demand
on structural change than previous studies. He also links technology to industry evolution.

2.1 The Role of Transaction Costs in Industry
Evolution
Coase discussed the importance of transaction costs in firm
decisions. Transaction costs are those costs that are required to
establish and maintain property rights (Allen). A second definition would be that transaction costs are costs associated with
inefficient pricing and production behavior (Joskow). Transaction
costs arise in business because of communication breakdowns,
imperfect information, incomplete contract stipulation, and
ambiguous entitlements. Naturally, as the number of transactions
that occur during the production and marketing of goods increases, transaction costs increase. Thus, larger producers are
likely to incur higher total transaction costs, since they are likely
to buy inputs and sell outputs more frequently than smaller
producers.
Williamson (1990) identifies dimensions that are critical in
characterizing transactions, describes governance structures that
are used in transactions, and discusses why certain governance
structures are preferred to others, given a particular transaction
type. He differentiates between classical contracts, which account
for all possible contingencies; neoclassical contracts, which are
14

dynamic in nature and all possible contingencies cannot be
covered; and relational contracts, which are transaction-specific
and characterized by the development of a dependent relationship between parties. The type of investment that is required for
transactions and the frequency of transactions influence the
contract governance that is likely to evolve. If little investment of
human or physical capital is required for a transaction, and the
frequency of transactions is either occasional or recurrent, then
classical contracting (market governance) will likely evolve.
Where transactions are occasional, non-recurrent, and the investment in human and physical capital is idiosyncratic or a mixture
between idiosyncratic and nonspecific, then trilateral governance,
a form of neoclassical contracting, is likely to evolve. With trilateral governance, an arbitrator may be used if a dispute arises
between the two parties. With recurrent, frequent transactions,
and an associated idiosyncratic investment, a unified governance
relational contract will arise (vertical integration). However, if
recurrent transactions are coupled with a mixed investment
characteristic (both nonspecific and idiosyncratic investments are
needed for the transaction) then bilateral governance relational
contracts will arise. Clearly, the nature of technology and its
investment characteristics influence the type of contract that is
likely to evolve in an industry. If technology is highly transactionspecific, such as a $500,000 hog facility useful for no purpose
other than hog production, and if the frequency of transactions
becomes high, then relational contracting is more likely to arise.
Williamson (1971) asks, why vertically integrate? He discusses the properties of a firm that are likely to lead to internal
organization as falling into three categories: incentives, controls,
and inherent structural advantages. One incentive for vertical
integration is that it attenuates potentially aggressive relationships that can arise between parties using arms-length bargaining. Such aggression can arise due to opportunism, where both
parties seek personal advantage. Having control over these
relationships, as well as available data at both levels to determine
the economic efficiency of each segment, are advantages. The
vertically integrated firm does not have to “guess” the production
efficiency and profits another segment is making; thus, there is
less argument among the segments that would arise due to
bounded rationality. Some inherent structural advantages of
15

vertical integration include economies of information exchange
and communication.
Williamson (1971) also discusses some market failure considerations in determining whether a firm will vertically integrate:
First, in a perfectly static environment, vertical integration holds
no advantage over a once-and-for-all contract. Second, vertical
integration allows an efficient decision process to be utilized.
Third, in cases of strategic misrepresentation (risk) from one or
both parties, vertical integration can be advantageous. For instance, moral hazard, externalities, ambiguous property rights,
and variable proportions distortions in production can lead to
vertical integration. As well, anti-competitive consequences such
as price discrimination and barriers to entry provide incentives
for vertical integration. Fourth, the firm gains information processing advantages. Fifth, more efficient institutional adaptation
may also lead to vertical integration. (Also see Casson for a
discussion of the advantages of vertical integration.)
In addition to transaction costs and asset specificity associated
with the idiosyncratic investment, Mahoney discusses the choice
of organizational form using agency theory, which incorporates
the concepts of non-separability and task programmability. Nonseparability refers to the inability to observe the final output of
team production and, subsequently, define each individual’s
input contribution to total production. For example, in broiler
production, the task of the broiler grower in raising the chickens
is well defined. The grower’s reward can, thus, be determined
according to his or her contribution to the total production process. Task programmability refers to the ability to measure task
input and use this as a basis for making rewards. An example of
high task programmability would be the contribution of labor on
an assembly line. In such a case, productivity is directly related to
effort and, thus, wages based upon productivity are likely to
reward effort. An example of a low task programmability process
would be crop production, where great effort may be expended,
yet crop yield may be low due to uncontrollable factors, such as
weather, diseases, and pests. With low task programmability,
monitoring is costly in determining a fair reward. Thus, in segments with low task programmability, contracts that require
monitoring will not be chosen.
16

3. A Model of Structural Change in
Agricultural Industries
The model adopted for examining industry evolution in this
paper was used by Gillespie et al., who modified the Reimund et
al. model. Figure 4 diagrams the model.

3.1 Stage 1: Development and Adoption of New
Technology
The initial stage of structural change is the development and
adoption of new technology that leads to increases in productivity
and economies of size. Adoption of technology often requires
investment in idiosyncratic assets and often is accompanied by an
increase in task programmability. Some producers are more
capable of adopting technology than others, often depending
upon availability of financial and human capital resources. Early
adopters benefit if the new technology proves to be profitable.
Depending upon regional production characteristics, new regions
may emerge with a comparative advantage. Producers who
initially cannot adopt the new technology search for sources of
capital through which they may adopt it.
Exogenous factors influence the primary production stage.
Consumer demand can influence the processor’s product mix,
altering demand for the primary product and stimulating the
development and adoption of new technology. Suppose a fastfood restaurant demands larger chicken parts. This derived
demand is communicated upstream to growers, who must produce larger birds. Growers demand technology that yields more
efficient bird production and offsets the associated higher death
rates suffered at higher broiler weights. Thus, consumer demand
can influence the development and adoption of new technology
throughout the production chain.
Public policy also influences the type of research that is conducted at both public and private research institutions and, thus,
the development of technology. For instance, the land grant
university system receives public funds for research and development of new technology for all stages of the livestock and poultry
industries. Farm income subsidies reduce the incentive for eligible
17

Figure 4. Life Cycle Model of Agicultural Industry Evolution
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growers to adopt technology that reduces production costs. In
addition, commodity groups can provide research funding, often
using check-off monies, for the development of new technology.

3.2

Stage 2: Shift in Location of Production

The adoption of new technology occurs in areas that have a
competitive advantage in using the new technology. Conduct at
Stage Two consists of new firms locating in the new production
region, while traditional production technology continues to be
used in the established production regions. Performance in the
traditional region suffers because the region no longer holds a
competitive advantage. If the traditional region cannot regain a
comparative or competitive advantage, it will be difficult for it to
expand, and industry survival in the region may be at risk.
However, if the established region’s competitive disadvantage
results primarily from exogenous public policies that discourage
adoption of the new technology, a change in public policy may be
initiated so that the region can remain competitive. For instance,
in traditional hog production states with anti-corporate farming
laws, the repeal of such laws could change competitive advantage.
Consumer demand is an exogenous factor that can affect the
location of production. If population is growing more rapidly in
one region than another, the location of production may be adjusted to reduce distribution costs.

3.3 Stage 3: Growth and Development of the
Industry
In this stage, the industry’s infrastructure grows and develops
as entrepreneurs expand. While this growth and development
may be occurring in the industry as a whole, it is particularly
prevalent in the new region of production. Larger, more specialized firms with superior information systems develop. These new
firms are generally characterized by greater risk associated with
being larger and less diversified. Agglomeration economies
develop in the new region and a more efficient industry evolves.
However, transaction costs increase as input suppliers, firms, and
buyers compete for higher qualities and quantities of inputs and
products.
19

3.4 Stage 4: Adjustment to Risk and Transaction
Costs
Stage 4 begins with high risk associated with large, specialized operations and high transaction costs associated with producers’ idiosyncratic investments. The relationships between
industry segments may become adversarial, especially if one
segment is perceived to hold market power and to be more
profitable. Risks and transaction costs are reduced via increased
vertical coordination among the firms. In the case of potential
adversarial relationships, vertical integration is likely to result.
The collective performance of all levels of the industry becomes
more industrialized and efficient.

3.5 Non-Mutual Exclusivity of Stages and
Exogenous Factors
The four stages in the evolution process are not mutually
exclusive. Each may be occurring simultaneously, though each
may be thought of as a necessary condition for the subsequent
stage. For instance, in the hog industry, the growth and development of the industry in a new production region, North Carolina,
occurred simultaneously with increased vertical coordination.
Firms that wished to expand using new technology, or new firms,
realized that increased vertical coordination would be advantageous and that a new location would be required to adopt and
use the new technology efficiently.
Exogenous and endogenous factors that may influence the
industry at any or all stages include public policy and basic
supply and demand conditions. Public policy may accelerate or
decelerate the evolution process, depending upon the nature of
the policy – is the policy intended to advance a region’s development in a particular industry or hinder it? For example, increasing
state tax rates, anti-corporate farming laws, and environmental
policies may influence the shift in location of agribusiness as well
as its growth and development. Exogenous demand factors that
may affect any or all stages of industry evolution include shifts in
population, changing tastes, substitutability of competing goods,
a changing balance of trade, and others. Exogenous supply
factors might include the availability of newly developed technology or a change in business attitude. An endogenous factor is
20

industry policy. Steps may be taken by the industry itself to
influence its evolution, such as the establishment of a trade
organization or check-off program.

4. Case Study: The U.S. Broiler Industry
4.1 The Current Structure of the U.S. Broiler
Industry
The U.S. broiler industry is characterized by relatively few
large, vertically integrated firms that coordinate more than 95
percent of U.S. broiler production. Thornton lists 46 firms that
were involved in broiler production in 1997, with the smallest,
College Hill Poultry, Inc., slaughtering one million pounds per
week, and the largest, Tyson Foods, Inc., slaughtering 152 million
pounds. The second largest company, Gold Kist, Inc., slaughtered
70 million pounds per week. The largest five firms each slaughtered more than 40 million pounds per week, 49 percent of total
broiler slaughter. Twenty-five firms slaughtered less than 10
million pounds each per week.
The vast majority of U.S. broilers are raised under contract.
Under a typical contract, the broiler grower provides housing,
equipment, labor, and litter to raise contractor-owned broilers to a
specified weight, typically between 4 and 6 pounds, using contractor specifications and contractor-owned feed, veterinary
services, and supplies. Broiler contracts reduce price risk relative
to that which would be faced by growers in the market (Knoeber
and Thurman). The contractor typically owns feed mills, hatcheries, and slaughter and processing facilities. The contracted portion
of the firm is in the grow-out of broilers and, perhaps, the production of eggs used in the production of chicks.
Poultry breeding is carried out by a small number of companies producing hybrid chicks and selling them under contract to
the large broiler integrators (Johnson and Ruttan). These companies use intensive genetic selection and testing with the intent of
producing birds that meet consumer and producer demands. All
major producers use hybrid chicks from these companies.

21

The following four sections relate the current structure of the
broiler industry to its evolution through the four stages of its life
cycle.

4.2 Stage 1: Adoption of Technology in Broiler
Production
Prior to World War II, broiler production was a sideline operation for most producers. Marion and Arthur (p. 38) identify
technology as a force for change, stating that “advances in broiler
breeding, feeding, disease and health control, housing, processing, shipping, and management procedures have provided
fundamental forces to transform the broiler complex from an
assemblage of loosely organized, small volume industries to the
present highly industrialized vertical system.”
Knoeber also discusses the importance of technology in the
industry’s evolution, noting disease control, breed development,
development of chickens particularly suited to meat rather than
egg production, and improvement in feed rations as important
innovations. Technical efficiency has increased. In 1950, 3.8
pounds of feed were required to produce one pound of broiler,
and 10 to 12 weeks were required to grow the bird to four
pounds. Today, 1.8 pounds of feed are required to produce one
pound of broiler, and it takes six weeks to grow the bird to 4.5
pounds. The industry performed with dramatically increased
technical efficiency. The stage was set for a shift to regions that
could best adopt the new technology.

4.3 Stage 2: Change in Location of Broiler
Production
From 1945 to 1995, U.S. broiler production increased 3,278
percent. Only two of the top 25 producing states decreased in
production over that period: New York and Michigan. Each of the
top 10 broiler-producing states in 1995 -- Georgia, Arkansas,
Alabama, North Carolina, Mississippi, Texas, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, and California -- had also been among the top 10
states in 1945, with the exception of Mississippi, which replaced
West Virginia. However, examination of the top three states
shows a shift from Delaware, Maryland, and Virginia to Georgia,
Arkansas, and Alabama. Thus, large increases in production in
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the southeastern states occurred relative to the Middle Atlantic
states. The industry also became more spatially concentrated: the
top 10 states in 1945 accounted for 74 percent of production, while
the top 10 in 1995 accounted for 81 percent. States that gained the
least included Delaware, Iowa, Maryland, Ohio, West Virginia,
and Virginia, while those that gained the most were Arkansas,
Mississippi, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Missouri, and Alabama. The
industry has slowly shifted southward.
Why did production shift south? Reimund et al. discuss the
structural factors: (1) New technology required a different type of
housing and capital investment from the previous technology.
“Producers in the new areas were not hampered by capital investment based on prior production methods or existing institutions
governing the production, financing, and marketing of broilers.”
(2) There were many underemployed farmers and a favorable
climate in the southern United States. The region had a comparative advantage in getting growers to invest significant labor in
large-scale broiler production. (3) Most broiler-processing plants
in traditional regions required significant modifications to meet
new standards for sanitation and waste disposal. Therefore, many
were closed. New plants opened in areas with a comparative
advantage in both processing and production. Industry conduct
was to move to a new location where the industry could perform
more efficiently.

4.4 Stage 3: Growth and Development of the
Broiler Industry
Growth and development of the broiler industry occurred as
integrators continued to move to and expand in the southern
United States. The most significant changes in industry structure
appear to have occurred during the 1950s and 1960s as formal
vertical coordination became the industry standard. In 1950, 42
percent of chicken produced on a ready-to-cook basis originated
from commercial broilers, while 58 percent was from other chickens (Reimund et al.). These percentages had switched to 92 and 8
percent, respectively, by 1972. From 1950 to 1997, commercial
broiler production increased from 2.0 billion pounds to 34.2 billion
pounds. The industry rapidly developed from a loosely structured, relatively small industry to one that closely monitored
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consumer demand and instituted mechanisms (contracts) that
efficiently transferred consumer signals upstream to primary
production. The resulting products were those demanded by an
increasingly health-conscious, convenience-food oriented population. Declining real prices of broiler meat relative to competing
meats also spurred consumption.

4.5 Stage 4: Adjustment to Risk and Transaction
Costs in the Broiler Industry
Changes in industry structure called for new, alternative
business arrangements that reduced risks and transaction costs.
The industry performed such that marketing and production
efficiencies increased. Marion and Arthur provide insight as to
how contracts arose in the broiler industry, discussing several
companies that originated the contracting process. In the 1930s,
Swift and Company, a large meat packer, entered into agreements
with growers to purchase birds at market prices after selling them
chicks from company-owned hatcheries. By the 1950s, growers
asked Swift and Company for contracts that reduced the risks
associated with declining prices. Swift offered the contracts to
maintain a reliable supply of broilers for its packing plant. The
original contracts contained floor prices below which losses were
shared by both Swift and the grower. Price recessions of 1959 and
1961 caused growers to demand contracts that separated their
returns from the market price. Thus, Swift began to retain ownership of the birds.
Tyson Foods evolved from a 1930s trucker of live broilers to its
current vertically integrated structure (Marion and Arthur). Upon
learning of growers’ difficulties in obtaining chicks, Mr. Tyson
bought a hatchery and sold chicks to growers whose broilers he
transported. This helped him coordinate transportation because
he knew when the birds would need to be transported given the
chick delivery date. He started his feed business during World
War II, when farmers began to experience difficulty obtaining
feed. Upon closures of a number of small poultry processing
plants in the 1950s due to mandatory federal inspection of processing plants, Tyson opened a processing plant. Shortly thereafter, Tyson began to retain ownership of the birds via grower
contracts.
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Ralston Purina, a feed company, also became involved in
contracting in the late 1950s, as growers became less able to
handle market risks. Their contracts guaranteed growers a minimum return. Later, processors were brought into the vertically
coordinated structure (Marion and Arthur).
The integration of Holly Farms essentially created one multifirm company. The company arose through the consolidation of
16 separate companies: “three hatcheries, a feed mill with grain
purchasing and hauling subsidiaries, five broiler contractors, one
breeder-flock company, a poultry processing plant, and three
related companies” (Marion and Arthur, p. 41). The forces causing
this decision were economic in nature. Successful firms that had
previously conducted business with one another became more
successful as transaction costs were reduced and competition
among them was eliminated.
While each of these cases is unique, several common forces
encouraged increased formal coordination. In adopting new
technology and expanding the size of their operations, broiler
growers faced increased market risk. Contracting could reduce
this risk. Whether the integrator was an input producer or a
processor, the need to secure markets for inputs or output and
reduce transaction costs associated with repeated market transactions was common to all. Contracts evolved from market governance to neoclassical contracting with mixed investment characteristics and occasional frequency. Eventually, as investments
became more idiosyncratic and transactions more recurrent,
relational contracts with unified governance evolved. Technology
drove the movement to this type of contract, given that the new
technologies used by both growers and processors were highly
idiosyncratic and shorter grow-out periods resulted in increased
market frequency.
Grower risk increased due to the larger size and capital requirements of broiler grower operations. Though larger growers
faced the same prices as smaller ones, they faced greater risk as
they sold in greater volumes. In addition, these growers were
more likely to be specialized in broiler production than the backyard growers. No other enterprise offset the increased price risk
faced by growers. A guaranteed or formula price offered by the
contractor allowed for a reduction in price risk.
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The environment in which broilers were raised became more
controlled due to climate controlled housing and increased
biosecurity, changing the nature of production risk. While the
potential for loss due to outside factors had decreased and a
higher degree of task programmability had resulted, potential
losses from an unfavorable event had graver consequences, given
the greater number of birds in each house. Thus, the downside
potential of the larger operations was potentially disastrous.
Growers searched for ways to decrease their risk.
Grower contracts decreased revenue risk, since most contracts
set a fee or margin floor, providing growers with certainty that
they would receive at least a minimum revenue per pound. In
addition to reducing revenue risk, tournament contracts also
reduced certain production risks (Knoeber). In a tournament
contract, growers compete with other growers delivering broilers
during the same week. A base (average) margin or fee per pound
is set. However, the grower with the highest (lowest) production
efficiency receives the highest (lowest) fee. Much of the environment faced by growers in the tournament is common; all use the
same feed, chicks, and field support and face similar climatic
conditions. An average fee to be received per pound is set.
Suppose feed provided to growers during a particular week is
substandard. All of the competing growers use the same feed.
While the overall distribution of technical efficiency is likely to be
lower for that week, the least (most) efficient grower will likely
receive the same fee per pound that he or she would have received during a “normal feed” week. Thus, the grower is not
penalized as greatly for common production risks that are not
within his or her control. (Of course, if all growers have fewer
birds to sell, then their total returns will be lower, so the tournament contract does not fully transfer common risks to the contractor.)
The presence of common risk shows that the highest degree of
task programmability had not been reached, though the feasibility
of a resource-providing contract with little monitoring cost lends
evidence that task programmability had increased. Idiosyncratic
risks, such as the risk of a disease infecting birds in a particular
flock, are not decreased via contract, except to the extent that the
contract specifies the use of certain technologies that reduce such
risks.
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Another important risk component to the broiler grow-out
phase was the increased risk associated with an idiosyncratic
investment. There are few alternative uses for a broiler house and
associated equipment. With tight operating margins in production, the grower must keep facilities at full capacity to cover
payments on the investment. Transaction costs associated with
negotiating repeated, timely purchases of feed and selling of birds
were large. Suppose a feed dealer had an inadequate supply of
feed to sell a grower on the day it was needed; multiple transactions with different feed dealers would be required to meet feed
demand. Suppose the processor were running at full capacity for
the week and there were no capacity for the grower’s birds; the
grower would be required to feed the birds longer, perhaps past
their optimal weight. These transaction and associated costs are
eliminated with a resource-providing contract.
An additional incentive for growers to accept contracts is the
reduced initial investment involved. Most potential growers do
not command the resources needed to enter broiler production
without a loan. This became an increasing concern as operational
sizes grew. Contracts reduced the total initial investment required
since the grower did not purchase feed, other variable inputs, and
broilers. Lenders were more likely to lend to growers under
contract. Growing under contract signaled that proven management practices would be used, markets would be available, and
lenders would face decreased risks.
What were the incentives for feed mills and processors to
coordinate with broiler growers? Both types of firms involve
idiosyncratic investments. To maintain the full capacity needed to
pay off their investments, processors need to schedule deliveries
ahead of time, which can be conducted via contract. Bird characteristics are also important. Some markets require 4.5-pound
birds, while others require 6.0-pound birds. If purchasing through
spot markets, it would be difficult for the processor to consistently obtain the type of bird needed. Information costs would be
high as buyers searched for birds of the correct weight and quality. Feed dealers contracted with growers to form a steady market
for their products, thus reducing informational transaction costs
associated with market search. Monitoring and enforcement costs
are also reduced under the contract. Growers had economic
incentives to use specific inputs and management practices.
27

Why has the broiler industry evolved toward quasi-vertical
integration via contracts with growers rather than vertical integration in its strictest sense? A number of studies have addressed
this question (e.g., Knoeber, and, more recently from an agency
theory perspective, Goodhue). Economies of size in production
are not as large for broilers as some other agricultural commodities, such as turkeys and eggs. Through financing, growers can
become involved in production; therefore, broiler companies do
not have to invest in the buildings, equipment, and land needed
to raise them. Also, with an average of 67 growers per poultry
complex, there are enough growers to fill a tournament
(Knoeber). The incentive for the grower to produce efficiently is
also high, given the possibility of losing a contract and having no
or few other sources of birds. Task programmability had increased
such that, with minimal monitoring using tournaments, the
efficient growers could be rewarded for good management. In like
fashion, the incentive exists for the less efficient grower to improve his or her management.

5. Case Study: The U.S. Hog Industry
5.1

The Current Structure of the U.S. Hog Industry

The percentage of hogs marketed from U.S. farms with 2,000
or more hogs increased from 17 percent in 1978 to 67 percent in
1994 (Plain); hog farm size also increased. In addition to this
physical structural change, all segments of the industry have
experienced changes in their ownership, management, and labor
functions. Traditionally, independent producers secured all inputs
and made all marketing and production decisions. The typical
producer operated a farrow-to-finish unit, breeding sows and
raising the offspring to slaughter weight. Others specialized in
farrow-to-nursery or finishing operations. Most traditional Midwestern hog farms have been vertically integrated with feed
production, as producers also raise feed grains. These firms have
not been vertically coordinated with a packer. Today, independent
production remains a common business arrangement for producing hogs.
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However, new forms of vertical coordination have evolved in
the hog industry. In many cases, operations that were vertically
integrated from farrowing through finishing have separated into
firms linked via vertical coordination. Some systems link primary
production to both the feed and packer segments via contract.
Most contracting has been driven by feed companies and packers.
By vertically coordinating with hog production, these firms secure
markets for their products and/or services. An example of a
vertically coordinated hog production firm is Smithfield Foods,
which contracts with hog producers and owns processing facilities, as well. Smithfield Foods recently acquired Murphy Family
Farms, the second-largest U.S. hog production firm.
Commonly used contracts in the hog finishing industry are
the flat-fee, incentive payment, and tournament contracts. All
three are typically resource-providing: the contractor supplies the
feed, feeder pigs, veterinary care, medication, transportation, and
a market for the hogs. Initially, a minimum payment is made to
producers, usually on a per hog basis. With incentive-based
contracts, bonuses are awarded based on technical efficiency. With
tournaments, bonuses are based on the technical efficiency of each
producer compared with other producers within the tournament.
Production contracts exist for farrow-to-nursery, finishing, and
farrow-to-finish operations. Grimes and Rhodes estimate that
finishing contracts are twice as common as either farrow-tonursery or farrow-to-finish contracts in the United States. Approximately 10 percent of the nation’s hogs were produced under
contract in 1989 (Rhodes); by 1994, 16 percent were under contract. Contracting has continued to increase since then.
Besides independent production and contract farming, other
business arrangements used by hog firms include various forms
of cooperatives, vertical coordination and vertical integration.
Some new cooperatives have arisen to provide independent
producers with some of the benefits of large-scale production,
while allowing them to maintain autonomy. (See Fulton and
Gillespie, and Reilly and Reynolds (a) and (b) for more information on the role of cooperatives.)
U.S. swine breeding stock is provided primarily by independent purebred breeders and breeding companies (Johnson and
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Ruttan). Purebred breeders are typically small producers who
serve small local markets. Breeding companies are large, international corporations that produce crossbred pigs, involving fewer
but more carefully selected breeds. Many large, vertically coordinated hog production firms are customers of breeding companies.
One exogenous factor that has influenced the structure of the
hog industry is consumer demand. Consumers have become
more discriminating buyers of pork. Vertical coordination has
served as an efficient vehicle for transmitting changing consumers’ product specifications to hog farmers (Barkema and Cook).
Other exogenous factors have included public policies, such as
environmental laws and anti-corporate farming legislation,
discussed under Stage Two.
The following four sections relate the current structure of the
hog industry and its evolution through the four stages of its life
cycle.

5.2 Stage 1: Adoption of New Technology in the
Hog Industry
By the 1940s, the stage was set for technological breakthroughs in hog production. Rural electrification gave rise to
confinement as power ventilation and lighting became available
(Baxter). Indoor facilities promoted improved economic efficiency
via slatted floors; improved means of storing, digesting, and
distributing animal wastes; farrowing crates; automated feed and
watering equipment; climate-controlled buildings; and computerized information systems for monitoring herd performance and
health. Conduct has been to adopt all-in/all-out production,
segregated early pig weaning, split-sex feeding, and other technology.
The hog industry has improved breeding stock, rations,
equipment and facilities, and disease control. Genetic improvements have resulted in leaner, faster-growing pigs. In 1954, the
average litter size per sow was 5.3 pigs; by 1997, this figure had
increased to 8.7 pigs (Census of Agriculture; USDA-National
Agricultural Statistics Service). Top producers were weaning 25
pigs per sow per year.
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5.3 Stage 2: Shift in Location of Production in the
Hog Industry
Significant shifts in location of production have occurred in
the hog industry in recent years. From 1987 to 1992, Iowa and
Illinois, the two largest hog-producing states in 1987, increased
production by 14 percent and 5 percent, respectively, to sales of
approximately 26.8 million and 10.3 million hogs, respectively.
However, North Carolina’s sales increased by 108 percent, to 10.8
million hogs, replacing Illinois as the second-largest producer.
Exogenous public policies, such as environmental regulations and
anti-corporate farming laws, are believed to be two reasons why
hog production has shifted in location (Hubbell and Welsh). As
growth and development occurred, rural communities protested
the negative environmental externalities generated by large hog
operations (Wang, Chen, and Asuming-Brempong), citing water
pollution, foul odors, and aesthetic degradation. To resolve these
problems, limitations were placed on manure disbursement, thus
constraining operations in traditional areas. Large firms searched
for alternative locations for growth.
In the early 1980s, anti-corporate farming legislation was
passed in Iowa, restricting corporate involvement in agricultural
production. This legislation was amended in 1988 to prohibit
contracting by packers (Johnson and Foster). Today, anti-corporate farming laws are effective barriers to entry in Iowa, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Kansas, North Dakota, South Dakota, Wisconsin, and Minnesota (Johnson and Foster, Hamilton and Andrews),
providing incentives for large-scale corporate farms to locate in
other states. Producers in many states have pushed for anticorporate farming legislation. The fear that contractors would
exploit contractees (producers) through market power and the
associated loss of managerial control by producers are two factors
that have led to resistance to contracts and vertical integration.
Gillespie and Fulton found that anti-corporate farming laws had
significantly decreased the net new entry of large hog operations
in states with such laws, relative to states without them.
Existing institutions have also affected production location. In
the traditional production regions, markets have been available
and ample expertise and capital have been devoted to hog production. Contract production has been viewed by some as a threat
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rather than an opportunity, as farmers value autonomy (Gillespie
and Eidman). Many potential producers in non-traditional hog
production regions viewed contracting as an opportunity. Neither
North Carolina nor Arkansas was a major hog-producing state
prior to widespread contracting. Both were, however, major
broiler-producing states, where contracting was common. Both
generally accepted hog industry expansion initially, though
environmental concerns associated with large confined animal
feeding units arose, and increased regulation soon followed.
Regions experiencing the greatest change in hog production
are the Southeast and West. North Carolina has been the fastest
growing state, increasing 489 percent from 1.9 million hogs in
1975 to 9.3 million in 1996 (Hubbell and Welsh). Arkansas grew
from 285,000 head in 1974 to 850,000 head in 1993. Oklahoma’s
hog production increased from 240,000 head to 1.32 million head
from 1993 to 1996 (Hubbell and Welsh). Western states, such as
Colorado, Utah, and Arizona, have also experienced significant
increases in hog production. This growth has been attributed to
producers’ willingness to accept vertically coordinated production
since little existing industry was threatened by the introduction of
new business arrangements. It is likely that hog production in
these areas results in fewer externalities because population
density is lower. While these regions may have competitive
advantages in the new production modes, it is doubtful that they
hold natural comparative advantages due to their higher input
costs, mainly feed.

5.4 Stage 3: Growth and Development of the Hog
Industry
The hog industry has grown over the past 10 years, though
not as extensively as did the broiler industry over the same
period. Figure 3 indicates modest growth in commercial slaughter
since the 1970s. Much of the growth has been in exports, which
remained relatively stable prior to 1981, then decreased through
1986. Exports increased steadily thereafter to 714 million pounds
in 1997 (National Pork Producers Council).
While hog slaughter has not increased to the extent of the
broiler industry, one must consider several factors. First, the slight
growth in pork slaughter is contrasted with the decrease in beef
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slaughter, a competitor red meat. The pork industry has been
attuned to consumer preferences and has introduced new products that meet consumer demand. The pork industry is in the
early phases of vertical coordination, with most producers remaining independent. It remains to be seen whether future hog
industry growth will occur primarily through vertical coordination (i.e., contracts).

5.5 Stage 4: Adjustments to Risk and Transaction
Costs in the Hog Industry
Among the first U.S. hog production contracts were those
offered by Murphy Farms in North Carolina in the late 1960s and
Tyson Foods in Arkansas in the early 1970s (Futrell). Over time,
other firms, such as Cargill, Carroll Foods, and Prestage Farms,
began contracting with producers.
Fulton and Gillespie discuss the 1994 establishment of Alliance Farms, a hog production cooperative formed via a joint
venture between Farmland Industries and Yuma M and M Cooperative in Colorado. A 2,400-sow farrow-to-nursery operation and
contracted finishing facilities were established. Farmland entered
the business to lower the risks and transaction costs associated
with securing an adequate quality and quantity of hogs for its
packing facilities. Yuma M and M Cooperative wanted to add
value to locally raised feed grains via hog production. Colorado
had little previous history in hog production. Without a contract,
few producers would likely have received loans to build facilities,
given their lack of experience. Fulton and Gillespie discuss the
potential competitive advantage held by Colorado over its neighboring anti-corporate- farming-law states, Kansas and Nebraska.
Alliance Farms represents the experience of a number of large,
vertically coordinated hog firms. The need of packers to obtain
consistent quality and quantities of hogs and the need of feed
dealers to secure feed markets drove the industry to formal
vertical coordination. Producers with insufficient equity capital to
fund the required idiosyncratic investment entered into an agreement whereby part of the initial investment was funded by the
integrator, producer income risk was reduced, and the total risk
associated with maintaining a market for hogs was reduced.
Risk has influenced producer decisions to adopt contracts. A
number of studies have shown the effect of risk on the contracting
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decision (e.g., Gillespie and Eidman, Johnson and Foster). According to Martin, price risk accounts for approximately 94 percent of
the risk that leads to income variability in hog production. If
independent hog producers face 100 percent price risk, contract
holders with or without tournaments face only 6.5 percent and 9.5
percent price risk, respectively (Martin). Thus, over 90 percent of
the price risk is shifted to the contractor.
Contracts also affect the production risk faced by producers.
Most contracts require state-of-the-art, bio-secure hog production
facilities. Production risk associated with events that affect all
producers in a particular area (common risk) can be reduced via
tournament contracts, as discussed with respect to the broiler
industry. A higher degree of task programmability has allowed
success of such contracts with minimal supervision. Producers’
efforts are rewarded based on feed efficiency and other efficiency
criteria.
Transaction costs are lower for contract producers than independent producers. As herd size has increased and transactions
have become more recurrent, independent producers have incurred higher information search costs involving the quality,
prices, and availability of inputs and the existence of hog markets. Large-scale independent producers who sell hogs weekly
must routinely collect and analyze price information. Negotiation
costs may also be significant. Arranging for transportation can be
costly. Timely delivery of the quantity and quality of feed needed
may pose a challenge for some independent producers. Most
contracts eliminate these costs, as feed and other inputs are
furnished by the contractor, and hogs are collected and shipped to
market by the contractor.
Business arrangements that have evolved in the hog industry
are heterogeneous across producers and contractors, relative to
the broiler industry. Contract provisions vary widely. Some
producers have entered into cooperative agreements, often to
benefit from many of the advantages of contracting while maintaining a higher level of autonomy. The vertical organization that
will eventually evolve as an industry standard in the hog industry is uncertain at this time.
The variation in business arrangements could be due to the
ability to cover cash expenses using a variety of business arrange34

ments. While significant economies of size exist in the industry,
smaller, independent farrow-to-finish operations (i.e., 100 sow)
have survived in recent years, though rapid exit among this
group continues. Market governance has continued in small
operations because transaction frequency is more occasional for
the producer – these producers may sell only twice per year, and
their facilities are older and fully depreciated. Trilateral governance using neoclassical contracts exists with some medium and
large farms. Transportation, administrative, and monitoring costs
for the contractor would also be higher with more small producers. However, these contracts exist primarily where the contract is
with a local producer and trust has developed over time. Most
contracts offered by large integrators are relational contracts; the
contractor is a quasi-vertical integrator. These producers have
highly recurrent transactions, and their relatively new facilities
are highly idiosyncratic in nature. Some analysis has been conducted examining the profits accruing to the primary production
segment. For example, Cozzarin and Westgren compared profits
of a contract with a quasi-vertical integrator with those of a
strategic alliance, concluding that “it would seem that some
changes would be necessary in order for an alliance to compete
over the long term with a franchise” (or contract). Thus, we
expect to see greater use of contracts with vertical coordinators.
Many of the incentives for broiler integrators’ involvement in
contracts also hold for the hog industry. Hennessy and Lawrence
discuss large contractors’ assessments of the advantages and
disadvantages of contracting, finding that increasing financial
leverage, reducing environmental and regulatory problems and
accessing motivated labor are among the most important advantages to contracting. They then discuss the influence of factors
such as asset specificity, opportunism, property rights, and risk
on the contractor’s incentive to contract. Like the broiler industry,
the need to reduce search and negotiation costs associated with
operating the packing plant at full capacity drives the integration
decision. Monitoring costs associated with making certain that
hogs are raised to the required specifications are reduced. Enforcement costs are lower because producers must raise hogs
under company specifications. Under contracts, producers must
strive for higher technical efficiency or face contract discontinuance.
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6.

Case Study: The U.S. Beef Industry

6.1

The Current Structure of the U.S. Beef Industry

Though the U.S. beef industry has become more vertically
coordinated, the nature and extent of the coordination differs
significantly from the hog and broiler industries. The cow-calf
segment is present in every U.S. state, with a wide array of herd
sizes. Calves sold by this segment range from 400 to 650 pounds,
depending upon region and producer. The stocker
(backgrounding) segment, where calves are prepared for the
feedlot, is present in some cases as a firm separate from the cowcalf segment. It occurs mainly in regions with quality winter
pasture (e.g., ryegrass in the Southeast and wheat in the Southern
Plains). In some regions, stockers may be retained through summer to take advantage of quality forages. The feedlot segment is
located mostly in the High Plains but is also in the West and
Midwest regions. Animals remain in the feedlot from 90 to 240
days prior to slaughter. Substantial economies of size exist with
feedlots. Of 50,000 U.S. feedlots, the 390 largest account for 65
percent of U.S.-marketed fed cattle (Ritchie et al.). Moreover, a
steer or heifer may be owned by three or more separate firms
during its relatively short lifetime.
Some vertical coordination exists between the three segments,
though the degree of coordination varies greatly among firms. No
single coordination mechanism can be considered an industry
standard. The majority of calves and stockers are sold via local
conventional auctions; others are sold via video auction or direct
order to the buyer. Producers selling via video auction or direct
order to the buyer on the farm or ranch benefit from economies of
size associated with assembling large lots of cattle and receiving
higher prices. Few firms are vertically integrated through all three
segments. It is more common for the cow-calf segment to vertically integrate only with the stocker segment.
Retained ownership is used by some cow-calf and stocker
producers whereby they maintain ownership of cattle through the
feedlot. A contract between the feedlot and producer specifies that
the producer is paid when the animals are marketed and slaughtered. Retained ownership in custom feedlots was introduced in
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response to economies of size that left small, individually owned
feedlots less competitive than large, commercial lots. Custom
feeding allowed smaller producers to continue to be involved in
the feeding segment, while taking advantage of cheaper feed and
other inputs available to larger feedlots (White and Chesnick). A
number of retained ownership arrangements exist, reflecting the
array of grazing and feeding alternatives available. Retained
ownership offers cow-calf or stocker producers an opportunity to
increase average returns, though the most profitable alternative
varies from year to year, depending upon the market (Peel). Use
of retained ownership remains limited.
The packing industry is characterized by a few firms that buy
most cattle via private treaty. The four-firm concentration ratio for
the beef packing industry was 82 percent in 1994 (USDA, Agricultural Statistical Abstracts). Some vertical coordination in the form
of captive supplies exists between feedlots and packers (Outlaw
et al.). Captive supplies include packer feeding, basis forward
contracts, and exclusive marketing/purchasing agreements (Ward
et al.). Packer feeding is a form of vertical integration whereby a
packer purchases feeder cattle and places them in packer-owned
or commercial feedlots. When finished, the cattle are transferred
to the packer. With basis forward contracts, the feedlot and packer
enter into a forward contract. For example, for the month that
cattle are to be slaughtered, the packer bids a futures market
basis. The feedlot determines when to select a futures market
price, from which a cash selling price is computed at an agreedupon basis. With exclusive marketing/purchasing agreements,
producers agree to supply packers with specified numbers of
cattle at a future date. Pricing agreements vary. Captive supplies
accounted for 17 percent to 23 percent of steer and heifer slaughter from 1988 to 1994 (Ward et al.).
The cattle breeding segment differs greatly from the broiler
and hog breeding segments. A number of purebred breed associations exist, each consisting of large numbers of independent
operators. Crossbreeding is common among cattle producers due
to the benefits of hybrid vigor and complementarity among sire
and dam breeds. Few cow-calf producers use improved breeding
technologies. Only 15 to 20 percent of U.S. beef cattle are the
result of artificial insemination (Keeton). Johnson and Ruttan
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discuss the reasons why commercial cattle producers have been
reluctant to adopt new breeding technologies. While cattle breeders are often guided by the objective of producing animals that
perform well in the show-ring, commercial production often
occurs under harsh environments. The latter often requires traits
not employed in the show-ring and, therefore, not accounted for
by the breeder.
An additional reason for the low rate of artificial insemination
in beef cows is that the animals are not confined, making assembly of animals for artificial insemination more difficult and costly.
Currently, improvements in genetic seedstock in the beef industry
arise primarily via (1) feedback from purchasers of the breeding
stock (cow-calf producers), (2) signals from judging at breed and
other livestock shows and, more recently, (3) expected progeny
differences (epd) data on breeding stock. With some exceptions,
these sources do not have immediate or meaningful contact with
consumers or the packer segment of the beef industry, thus
superceding the signals from these two sources.
While retained ownership, vertical integration, and captive
supplies have increased the extent of vertical coordination, the
beef cattle market remains relatively inefficient at transferring
consumer preferences to cattle producers via the pricing system.
Each industry segment has different goals. Each pays relatively
different prices for various cattle characteristics, clouding and
confusing market signals, especially at the cow-calf level.
Outlaw et al. discuss the following goals and incentives of the
different segments: cow-calf producers are paid on pounds of
calves produced; thus they emphasize calving rate, weaning
weight, birth weight, cow milk production, and calving ease.
Stocker operators are much less concerned with characteristics of
the mother cow. Rate of gain, feed conversion, breed, condition,
and animal color are of more importance. Cattle feeders are
concerned with cattle and feed prices, feed conversion, quality
grades, and rate of gain. Cattle continue to be sold to packers in
pens. Packers usually buy all cattle in a pen; thus, cattle are sold
on an average price basis. A problem arises in that individual
animals are not priced according to their traits (however, valuebased marketing has increased, reducing this problem). Consumers also have differing preferences, further clouding the market
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signals. The result is potentially confusing price signals at various
levels of the production / marketing channel.
The following three sections discuss the evolution of the U.S.
beef industry to its current structure.

6.2 Stage 1: Adoption of New Technology in the
Beef Industry
Technological change has increased beef cattle economic
efficiency. Ritchie et al. discuss some technological advances,
including, but not limited to, artificial insemination (1936), bovine
embryo transfers, growth promotants (1954), and, more recently,
further breeding technology, such as development of epds. Despite these advances, cattle productivity has not increased as
rapidly as hog or poultry productivity. For instance, dressed beef
production per cow increased 25 percent from 1980 to 1995, while
dressed pork production per sow increased 90 percent over the
period (Brester et al.).
Part of the reason for the slower rate of increase for dressed
beef production per cow could be attributed to the longer generation interval for cattle compared with pigs and poultry. However,
relatively few advanced breeding technologies are widely used.
At least 15 breeds are used in Louisiana (Schupp), while many
others are used in other parts of the United States. due largely to
different environmental conditions. By comparison, both the hog
and poultry industries have concentrated on improving the
production efficiencies of a few lines of genetics. In the beef
industry, while animals with certain traits command higher prices
than others, little industry coordination has emerged to encourage product uniformity at the packer level.

6.3 Stage 2: Shift in Location of Production in the
Beef Industry
The major shift in beef cattle production has been with the
feedlot segment from the Midwest to the Southern High Plains
states (Reimund et al.). The High Plains emerged as a major grain
production region during the early 1970s, with sorghum being
grown under irrigation, making it a grain surplus region. With
growing economies of size in the feedlot segment, the relative
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sparseness of human population in the High Plains was attractive
for cattle feeding. However, this expansion was not associated
with a reduction of cattle feeding in the traditional production
region. Expansion in the High Plains accounted for most of the
expansion in U.S. cattle feeding. Industry conduct was to expand
in the new region. Eventually, custom feeding and captive supplies emerged as economies of size increased in the feedlot and
packer segments.

6.4 Stages 3 and 4: Growth and Development and
Adjustments to Risk and Transaction Costs in the
Beef Industry
Limited vertical coordination has evolved in the beef industry.
A recently developed vertically coordinated organization is the
Farmland Supreme Beef Alliance, through Farmland Industries
(Farmland Cooperative System), which is organized as a cooperative. The goal is to secure high quality animals for which producers are paid premium prices. All animals must be at least 50
percent Black Angus. All English and selected Continental crossbreeds are allowed; dairy and Brahman crossbreeds are not. Cattle
are finished at Supreme Cattle Feeders, Inc., and sold via valuebased marketing to Farmland National Beef Packing Company.
Producers receive incentives for carcasses that quality grade
higher than USDA Select. Producers may retain ownership,
partnership or direct-sale feeder calves. Higher premiums are
gained by producers retaining at least 50 percent ownership. In
such cases, producers receive information for decision making. By
targeting a specific branded end product, such as Farmland Black
Angus Beef and Certified Angus Beef, producers receive consumer feedback, feedlot performance, and carcass information.
Other beef alliances include Bradley Natural Beef, with 100
producers in 18 states who supply feeders and calves to three
feedlots (Davis). Bradley uses a grid pricing system based on
carcass weight, marbling scores, yield grades, and brand location.
No implants or added growth hormones are allowed. Precision
Beef Alliance, Certified Uniform Beef, and Pfizer Select Supplier
programs are other examples of beef alliances through which
cattle producers can receive premium prices. These strategic
alliances reflect efforts to meet consumer demand. Packers recog40

nize the need to provide consistent, uniform quality products for
sale at the retail level.
In addition to strategic alliances, captive supplies have a
number of advantages. Packers are guaranteed a certain quantity
of fed cattle to be delivered at a specified future date. The price is
determined ahead of time, reducing price risk to feeders. Shortrun search costs associated with identifying cattle markets are
reduced, and financing may be more available to feedlots under
these agreements.
While certain segments of the beef industry have moved
toward vertical coordination, formal coordination continues to be
limited. There is very little coordination from packers to the
breeding stock segment. While the Farmland Beef Alliance contract specifies Angus breeding, up to 50 percent of another breed
may be present. Participation by cow-calf producers in retained
ownership programs is often loosely organized, so that a producer can be involved whenever he or she deems it advantageous. This producer choice differs greatly from the control
exercised by the packer over breeding, gestation, and birth or
hatching in the hog and broiler industries, where a producer
typically contracts either all or none of his or her production. Use
of captive supplies is limited. It appears that incentives are lacking for the beef industry to vertically coordinate on a large scale.
Why is this so?
The relatively small idiosyncratic capital investment in buildings and equipment in the cow-calf and stocker segments does
not provide incentive for contracting in the beef industry. The
major capital expenditure other than land in both segments is
fencing (Boucher and Gillespie), which may not be identified as
idiosyncratic since many farmers use fencing for purposes of
maintaining property boundaries. In short, the cow-calf and
stocker industries are contestable industries, where firms can
enter or exit with minimum loss of investment capital.
Related to the specific asset argument is the fact that economies of size for cow-calf and stocker operations essentially peak
at relatively small volumes (Lamb and Beshear). Numerous 20cow cow-calf operations exist. The lack of a substantial, leveraged
fixed investment with low opportunity cost contributes to the
relatively small economies of size. Coupled with the small econo41

mies of size is the apparent willingness of some small cow-calf
producers to produce calves at prices that fail to cover full economic costs (Boucher and Gillespie). In short, cattle are not the
primary source of income for the smaller-volume producers.
Thus, the incentive to coordinate with an up- or downstream firm
is almost nonexistent.
Related to the absence of size economies is the fact that cattle
operations are likely to sell calves and stockers infrequently, many
only once per year. Many producers utilize a limited breeding
season. This, coupled with the biological capacity of a cow to
produce only one offspring per year, leads to infrequent sales.
Thus, transaction costs associated with search for and negotiations with buyers are relatively low for these producers. Most
cattle producers have access to local auctions for selling animals.
Thus, there is little cost associated with identifying and securing a
market. Unlike broiler and hog producers, small cow-calf and
stocker producers have little incentive to accept contracts that
assure market availability or reduction of market transaction
costs.
The low level of task programmability in beef cattle production also limits vertical coordination. Cattle production is primarily land-based, with heterogeneous forage as a major input.
Vastly different production climates call for different breed types.
Exogenous factors, such as weather, highly influence productivity.
It would be difficult for a vertical coordinator (up- or downstream
from cow-calf production) to accurately assess a cow-calf
producer’s efforts and provide a fair reward without significant
monitoring. Without monitoring, incentive exists for the producer
to use an alternative, lower-cost resource, hoping for the prospect
of a high level of technical efficiency. Using the model proposed
by Mahoney, the characteristic low task programmability, low
asset specificity, and low non-separability of cow-calf production,
is likely to lead to use of a spot market.
For the packer, the use of captive supplies can reduce shortrun search costs, enabling the schedule of slaughter in advance.
Programs such as the Farmland Supreme Beef Alliance help
packers to ensure supplies of uniform quality cattle, rather than
heterogeneous lots. However, the incentives have not been strong
enough to entice packers to either widespread vertically coordi42

nate or force value-based marketing. Some of the disincentives
include: (1) packers have been successful in pricing pens of cattle
based on average value; (2) the overall consumer market for beef
has been sufficiently diverse; the carcass from almost any animal
has a market. Packers can often alter less-than-desirable carcasses
so that they can be sold as boxed beef; (3) consumers have increasingly accepted fresh beef in ground form, which does not
require a uniform quality carcass. Beef packer branding, which
would require consistent quality cattle, has been limited. Fresh
beef is not a strong candidate for branding. Beef is USDA quality
graded, and the grade serves as a limited proxy for brand; and (4)
cow-calf producers have shown a willingness to provide weaned
calves at residual prices without exiting the industry.
Overall, coordination between packers and feedlots remains
limited but is consistent with the lack of being highly attuned to
consumer preferences. According to Lamb and Beshear, the lack
of coordination is “. . .surprising, since concentration in the
packing industry could facilitate greater coordination.” While a
number of factors explain the beef industry’s relative lack of
progress toward vertical coordination, there appears to be a lack
of clear direction envisioned by the industry. Industry policy, an
endogenous factor that could accelerate movement through the
four stages of evolution, has generally been lacking. Lamb and
Beshear state that, “In short, the beef industry currently has no
clear path toward vertical coordination.”

7. Comparing and Contrasting the
Evolution of the Three Industries
7.1 Stages 1, 2, and 3: Technology Adoption,
Location of Production, and Industry Growth
Each of the three meat industries has advanced significantly
through the four stages of industry evolution. Significant public
funding has been devoted to develop technology for the industries, with new technology resulting. Examining U.S. 1862 land
grant university research funding for the three industries from
1975 to 1995, beef had consistently higher funding than poultry
and swine (USDA-CSREES). In 1975, $44 million, $23 million, and
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$18 million were appropriated to beef, poultry, and swine research, respectively, in land grant universities. Similar proportions
were funded in 1995, when $110 million, $56 million, and $57
million were funded for the three industries, respectively. Swine
research funding increased relative to the others. While these
figures include industry-funded university research, they do not
include private research, which is likely to be relatively greater for
integrated industries, such as poultry.
Three factors have been particularly important in increasing
the economic efficiency of broiler and hog production: (1) advances in nutrition, (2) confinement housing, allowing for environmental control and clear production standards, and (3) the
biological capability of hogs and broilers to dramatically increase
the number of offspring within a specified time frame. The landbased nature of cow-calf and stocker production and relatively
low profitability have been associated with production conducted
in heterogeneous environments using assets not specific to cattle.
Task programmability for beef production has been low compared
with broilers and hogs.
All three industries have experienced shifts in location of
production as new production technology has become available.
Locational shifts have been southward for the hog and broiler
industries due to lower cost labor and other inputs and a favorable business environment. The cattle industry shifted location
during the 1970s as cattle feeding shifted to the grain-producing
High Plains. Substantial industry growth has occurred in all three
industries, especially the vertically coordinated broiler industry.

7.2 Stage Four: Adjustment to Risk and Transaction
Costs
7.2.1 Risk
Price and production risks have influenced the industries’
movements toward vertical coordination. Broiler growers became
less willing to accept risks due to their increased operational sizes
and associated higher risk. Income risk reduction is also a major
incentive for hog producers to accept contracts. Price risk reduction for feeders is a factor leading to captive supply arrangements
in the beef cattle industry. A common thread is that increased size
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economies have led to larger operations that have, in turn, increased risk. Vertical coordination has allowed up- and downstream firms to share risk, so that one firm is not forced to bear all
of the risk. Relatively small cow-calf and stocker operations have
experienced little change in risk due to slower increases in firm
size, thus resulting in relatively less incentive for these segments
to vertically coordinate.1

7.2.2 The Sources of Transaction Costs
Williamson (1990) discusses the importance of asset specificity
and opportunism in influencing the evolution of industries. Asset
specificity may lead to greater opportunism: as a firm’s alternative uses for its assets decrease, an incentive exists for up- or
downstream firms holding market power to exploit the firm.
Today’s state-of-the-art hog and broiler production facilities are
specific assets that involve idiosyncratic investments. In many
areas where contracted broiler and hog production is prevalent,
one or at most a few potential live markets exist. An incentive
exists for buyers to collude and exploit growers. While the use of
resource-providing contracts does not completely prevent such
opportunism, the buyer’s ownership of variable and some fixed
inputs may help curb exploitation, given that the buyer is, in a
sense, a partner in the business. Moreover, the final move to full
vertical integration is curbed as the integrator prefers not to make
the large investment in these facilities, utilities, and fuel. Contractual terms provide producers the incentive to give an adequate
level of management since they are paid based upon productivity
and ownership of an idiosyncratic investment. Contracts are
effective in these industries because their provisions provide the
basis for these idiosyncratic investments to cashflow. Less idiosyncratic investment is involved in grazing cattle; thus, there is
less incentive for cattle producers to follow strict specifications set
by a vertically integrated firm.

7.2.3 Transaction Costs
A number of transaction costs have led to the current structure
of the three industries. Information and search costs incurred by
packers have increased as packers have worked to procure animals that meet their specifications. More transactions are obvi45

ously needed to fill larger capacity plants. The increasing number
of transactions and the scrutiny involved in acquiring quality
animals has led to contracting in both the hog and broiler industries. In the cattle industry, captive supplies have allowed packers
to reduce short-run search costs associated with acquiring consistent quantities of uniform quality cattle (though they have also
increased search costs associated with securing feeder cattle
inputs). Related to the search and information transaction costs in
this case is asset fixity. With a fixed investment, the packer needs
to utilize facilities at a volume that minimizes cost. Contracting is
among the most efficient means of ensuring timely availability of
needed throughput for the plant. Not only have search costs been
important for packers, but also for feed suppliers. In all three
industries, feed mills have coordinated with animal feeders to
lower costs associated with searching for customers -- most cattle
feedlots own their own feed mills. With broilers and hogs, coordination via contract has allowed feed mills to sell previously
agreed-upon quantities of feed to producers, thus lowering longrun search and storage costs.
With increased firm sizes, more negotiation costs for buying
inputs and selling products have been required. By signing a
contract, the number of negotiations is reduced to only when a
contract is signed, once every two to three years in the broiler and
hog industries. These costs are significantly reduced for all parties
to the contract. The beef feedlot sector conducts large numbers of
transactions and has become more vertically coordinated with
packers. However, fewer annual transactions are needed in most
cow-calf operations, where many producers sell calves once per
year. Thus, negotiation costs have not led to greater vertical
coordination in the cow-calf segment. There has been little need
for cow-calf and stocker producers to vertically coordinate with
the feed segment since these segments are primarily foragebased.

7.3 Is the Beef Industry Poised to Move to a More
Vertically Coordinated Structure?
Before addressing this question, it is worthwhile to discuss the
benefits to the beef industry of moving toward a more vertically
coordinated structure, using lessons learned from the poultry and
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hog industries. One of the benefits would be the production of
more consistent and uniform quality beef cuts. Due partially to
the increased availability of consistent quality meats in the poultry and pork industries, consumers have come to expect meats
that are of consistent and uniform quality, especially in flavor and
tenderness. Within the USDA beef grades, the only proxy for
quality currently available in the beef industry, quality varies
significantly. In addition to consistent quality, consumers increasingly demand convenient, value-added products. For these
products to be produced efficiently by packers, beef carcasses
need to be of uniform and consistent size, composition, and
quality, enabling the efficient transformation of carcasses to
specific value-added retail products. The consumer’s demand for
beef must be efficiently communicated to all segments of the
industry so that derived demands for feeders, calves, and ultimately replacement breeding stock are based almost exclusively
upon primary demand. Appropriately structured vertical coordination could help achieve this goal.
To achieve greater consistency in carcass size, quality, and
composition, a reduction in the number of breeds and increased
concentration on improved genetics within the reduced set of
breeds are needed. This reduction in breeds would not only result
in increased product consistency but also allow more concentrated effort within this narrow set of breeds on developing
genetic stock with higher reproductive efficiencies and more
efficient performance in the feedlot. Feed-to-gain ratios could be
significantly reduced, as has occurred through breeding efforts in
the poultry and hog industries. Thus, increased vertical coordination could not only serve to increase beef demand through the
provision of more consistent quality products, but in the long run,
it could also provide for more efficient animals, reducing production costs and allowing retail beef prices to decrease relative to
competing meats.
Strides toward increased industry vertical coordination,
including packer captive supplies, packer use of grade and yield
pricing, retained ownership, and alternative marketing techniques, have been limited. Moreover, members of the Louisiana
beef industry do “not anticipate large changes in the organization
of firms in the industry,” and “with minor exceptions, . . .(do) not
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feel that integration or contracting (will) increase measurably
within the Louisiana beef industry” (Schupp). However, unless
pricing and technical efficiency in all segments increases significantly and product consistency increases, prices are likely to
remain high for beef relative to its competing products, and beef
demand will continue to wane. Previous discussion in this publication examines the impediments to a supply chain structure (i.e.,
task programmability, the nature of risk, economies of size, etc.)
for the beef industry. Indeed, Lamb and Beshear do not predict
that the supply chain structure of the broiler and hog industries
will evolve in the beef industry. Thus, it appears that the beef
industry is not poised to move toward a vertically coordinated
structure that resembles the hog and broiler industries.
It is not essential that an industry move to a vertically integrated, supply chain structure to increase operational and/or
pricing efficiency. If markets between up- and downstream segments operate efficiently and information is transferred effectively, the added net benefits of integration in that industry may
be negligible. If feedlots can transfer price signals to cow-calf
producers that reveal packer and consumer preferences, many of
the inefficiencies currently existing in the industry can be eliminated. In such a case, the pricing mechanism serves as the coordinator. However, today’s calf prices reflect the preferences of
hundreds of order buyers and dealers who have limited knowledge of what consumers demand and of how calves will meet
these preferences after feedlot finishing.
What type of industry structure can begin to correct the
problems faced by the current beef industry? In the authors’
opinion, the packer must be the primary instigator of a new, more
efficient industry structure. The packer segment is the closest
segment to the consumer that deals with live animals. Increased
or forced use of value-based pricing by packers would be an
important first step in achieving this end. While value-based
pricing has had limited success, refinement and widespread
adoption would provide incentives for feedlots to produce animals (i.e., carcasses) with consumer-desired traits.2 With greater
incentive to produce consistently high quality cattle, feedlots
would have significant incentive to offer prices for calves and
stockers that reflect their needs. One way to get cow-calf and
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stocker producers to provide these animals would be via cooperatives and strategic alliances that provide large quantities of consistently high quality animals.3 With the availability of more uniform animals, packers could begin to specialize in the types of
meat products they handle. Those deciding to produce high
quality cuts could use captive supplies to procure consistently
high quality animals.
Upon the increase of value-based marketing, beef breed
associations and state cattlemen’s associations could serve as
facilitators for a more efficient industry by inviting packer buyers
to their meetings to discuss the types of animals they prefer.
These preferences would be expressed in terms of the type of calf
that is likely to command a premium price. This would help in
identifying a subset of beef breeds or combination of beef breeds
whose offspring offer high feedlot performance and produce meat
desired by consumers. Strategic alliances could be formed based
upon this knowledge.
The beef industry needs to be proactive in helping to identify
the smaller subset of breeds that can provide the types of products that consumers prefer. After this subset of breeds is identified, comprehensive research is needed to significantly improve
the efficiencies of each of these breeds under feedlot conditions so
that feed costs and, thus, retail prices can be reduced. However, in
order for such incentives to be provided for increased efficiency,
packers must send clear price signals to producers. Continued
purchase of calves in lots where all calves command the same
price will not achieve this end.

8. Summary and Further Considerations
A number of studies have examined the evolution of agricultural industries. In this paper, a modified Reimund et al. model is
used to examine the evolution of the U.S. broiler, hog, and cattle
industries. In addition, transaction cost and agency theory are
used to explain why the evolutionary paths of the three industries
have differed.
While this paper discusses the evolution of the industries
toward vertical coordination as moving toward more efficient
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industries, we acknowledge the negative consequences associated
with many vertically coordinated systems. Some of these systems
result in less producer autonomy than can be achieved through a
non-vertically coordinated system. While broiler growers have
gained some benefits through contracting, as discussed earlier in
the publication, they have foregone the independence associated
with making one’s own short-run production and marketing
decisions. They have also become dependent on the contractor to
deal with them in a manner that is deemed “fair” by both parties.
Other topics concerning vertical coordination and vertical
integration include the following questions. (1) Can independent
producers in all segments of the industries respond to new government regulations, such as those issued by USDA, FDA, and
EPA, as effectively as vertically integrated or coordinated firms?
(2) What would be the effect of unionization of producers on
economic efficiency in a vertically coordinated system? The
prospect of unionization is gaining popularity in the broiler
industry. (3) How does the inclusion of only one vertically coordinated firm in an area affect producer bargaining power? Each of
these topics are issues for consideration and research in determining the direction an industry should proceed.
Perhaps the most important point that can be taken from this
discussion is the importance of technology and an industry’s
associated unique production processes in moving an industry to
a vertically coordinated system. Without a unique technology to
control the production process, little vertical coordination is likely
to evolve. Substantial idiosyncratic investment in technology
provides the incentive for producers to vertically coordinate or
integrate with an upstream or downstream segment to ensure
market access. Without idiosyncratic investments that are used to
increase efficiency, producers are unlikely to have the incentive to
relinquish autonomy to reduce their risk and transaction costs.
Task programmability is also a key ingredient for an industry to
evolve to more controlled forms of vertical coordination. If extensive monitoring is needed for an up- or downstream firm to
ensure that the primary production firm is not shirking on the
agreement, attempts at relational contracting are likely to fail.
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Given the relatively high prices for beef and fewer beef valueadded products, the industry needs to increase its production and
market efficiencies. The achievement of higher technical efficiency
will pose a challenge, given that one offspring per year is a biological constraint and different regions of land-based production
call for different breed types. However, increased coordination in
the form of price incentives for production uniformity could help
the industry achieve these efficiencies.

9. Endnotes
1. Though the above argument suggests that cattle producers
have experienced less risk relative to larger producers in their
competitor industries due to the relatively smaller size of the
operations, we must acknowledge that the steadily increasing
demand for chicken over the past 50 years has led to relative
stability in broiler prices, compared with cyclic and declining
beef prices. The beef industry’s significant decrease in per
capita consumption, along with higher carcass weights, has
led to continued downward pressures on beef prices.
2. Value-based marketing forces the packer to assess a value for
individual animals, a task not needed when pens of cattle are
purchased based on averages. The current system, where pens
of cattle are purchased at an average price, results in both
inferior and superior animals not being revealed, masking any
means of correct price signaling to the cow-calf producer
segment.
3. Getting small-scale cow-calf producers, whose primary income
source is not cattle, to enter into cooperatives and strategic
alliances could provide a significant challenge. However, in the
long run, as superior breeds command higher prices that
reflect their quality, the incentive to participate will increase.
51

10. Glossary
Agglomeration Economies – Gillespie et al. state that,
“Agglomeration economies arise as an industry
develops in a region, reducing the costs that industry
players must expend to conduct business. As more
firms enter, input suppliers and markets increase in
number, providing more competition, lower
transportation costs, and thus creating a more efficient
industry.”
Arms-Length Bargaining – Arbitrage that must occur when using
spot markets, as opposed to an internal coordination
mechanism.
Asset Specificity – An asset is said to be specific to a particular
production process if it is useless or substantially less
valuable in the production process of any other
product.
Bounded Rationality – Rationality is “a style of behavior that is
appropriate to the achievement of given goals, within
the limits imposed by given conditions and
constraints.” (Simon) Rationality may be bounded if
the decision maker has incomplete information or has
alternative goals to “classical goals.”
Comparative Advantage – In this publication, comparative
advantage refers to a region’s natural relative
advantage in production.
Competitive Advantage – In this publication, competitive
advantage refers to a region’s relative advantage in
production due not solely to “natural” conditions but
also to outside forces such as political conditions.
Downstream Firm – A firm that is part of the downstream
industry segment. The downstream segment acquires
inputs that are produced by upstream segments of an
industry.
Economies of Size – Refers to the reduction in the cost per unit of
output that occurs as a firm produces more units of
output.
Four-Firm Concentration Ratio – The proportion of total sales made
by the four largest firms in an industry.
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Idiosyncratic Investment – An investment that is made in inputs
such as capital, labor, machinery, or buildings that are
useful only for the production of a specific item. An
example would be the investment in a milk tank,
which is useful only in production of milk in a dairy
operation. The opposite of a non-specific investment.
Moral Hazard – Moral hazard arises when there is a conjoining of
inharmonious incentives with uncertainty. Arrow
discusses moral hazard as the “confounding of risks
and decisions.”
Non-Specific Investment – An investment that is made in inputs
such as capital, labor, machinery, or buildings that is
useful for the production of more than one item. An
example would be the investment in a medium-sized
tractor, which is a useful input for many agricultural
enterprises. The opposite of an idiosyncratic
investment.
Opportunism – The incentive of one firm to exploit another, as in
the case of a monopoly that sells to a downstream
firm in a purely competitive market.
Retained Ownership – Retained ownership occurs when an input
supplier continues to own the input as it moves
through the downstream production segment. An
example would be the case where a cow-calf producer
retains ownership of the calf during its growth in the
downstream feedlot segment.
Strategic Misrepresentation Risk – Prior to entering a contract
between two firms, risk is faced by both sides that the
contract is incomplete, that is does not fully specify all
possible contingencies. The risk associated with the
other firm not specifying a specific contingency for
strategic reasons is termed as strategic
misrepresentation risk.
Task Programmability – A task is said to be “programmable” and,
thus, have a high level of “task programmability” if
the use of specific inputs and technology at prescribed
levels leads to a predictable level of output. In cases
where specific levels of input lead to less predictable
output levels, the task is said to have a low level of
“task programmability.”
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Technical Efficiency – Refers to the capacity of producing the
maximum level of output for a given quantity of
inputs and technology.
Up-Stream Firm – A firm that is part of the upstream industry
segment. The upstream segment produces inputs that
are used by downstream segments of an industry.
Variable Proportions Distortions – Variable proportions refers to the
ability of a production firm to freely substitute one
input for another in a production process, thus
allowing for varying proportions of inputs. Variable
proportions distortion is defined in the context of a
monopoly input supplier and the resultant incentive of
the downstream production firms to vertically
integrate with the supplier.
Vertical Coordination – The link of up- and downstream firms into
a single entity.
Vertical Integration – The link of up- and downstream firms
through ownership in a single firm.
Video Auction – A video auction is an auction that is conducted via
audio-video equipment, usually in multiple
geographic locations.
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